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Abstract—A honeypot is a type of security facility deliberately
created to be probed, attacked and compromised. It is often used
for protecting production systems by detecting and deflecting
unauthorized accesses. It is also useful for investigating the
behaviour of attackers, and in particular, unknown attacks. For
the past 17 years much effort has been invested in the research
and development of honeypot based techniques and tools and
they have evolved to become an increasingly powerful means
of defending against the creations of the blackhat community.
In this paper, by studying multiple honeypot systems, the two
essential elements of honeypots - the decoy and the security
program - are captured and presented, together with two abstract
organizational forms - independent and cooperative - in which
these two elements can be integrated. A novel decoy and security
program (D-P) based taxonomy is proposed, for the purpose
of investigating and classifying the various techniques involved
in honeypot systems. An extensive set of honeypot projects and
research, which cover the techniques applied in both independent
and cooperative honeypots, is surveyed under the taxonomy
framework. Finally, the taxonomy is applied to a wide set of tools
and systems in order to demonstrate its validity and predict the
tendency of honeypot development.
Index Terms—Honeypots, Computer Security, Virtualization,
Network Security, Intrusion Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
THE new domain of cyberspace is so pervasive that theUS Department of Defense has put cyberspace on a par
with land, sea, and air as a war-fighting domain [1]. Systems
in cyberspace are constantly faced with cyber threats every
day. In 2015, Symantec discovered 54 zero-day vulnerabilities,
a 125 percent increase from the year before [2]. Since
cyber threats cannot be eliminated completely, the strategy
to securing cyberspace is to remove as many vulnerabilities
as possible before they can be exploited [3]. A honeypot is
a vital security facility aimed at sacrificing its resource to
investigate unauthorized accesses in order to discover potential
vulnerabilities in operational systems, and reduce the risks.
Due to its unique design and application features, it can help
to address the deficiencies of other existing security methods.
Firewalls are often deployed around the perimeter of an
organization in order to block unauthorized access by filtering
certain ports [4] and content, but they do little to evaluate
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the traffic. They can block all accesses to a certain service in
order to prevent malevolent traffic, but this also blocks any
benevolent traffic that wants to access the service. Conversely,
honeypots are aimed at opening ports in order to capture
as many attacks as possible for subsequent data analysis.
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is used to evaluate the
traffic and detect any inappropriate, incorrect, and anomalous
activity. However, IDSs often have the “false alert problem”,
i.e. signature (rule-based) IDSs often generate false negative
alerts, whilst anomaly-based IDSs generate false positive
alerts. Compared to an IDS, a honeypot has the big advantage
that it never generates false alerts, because any observed traffic
to it is suspicious since there is no production service running
on the honeypot. Hence, an integration of a honeypot with an
IDS can largely reduce the number of false alerts [5].
An intrusion prevention system (IPS), comprising a firewall
plus an IDS, can evaluate the traffic and block malicious
data. It acts as a shield against attacks, but it is not able
to distinguish whether an application-layer request is normal
or not. This drawback could potentially result in attacks
permeating the shield without being detected. For example,
a social engineering attacker may gain sensitive information
by using a compromised legitimate username and password
[6]. However, if an IPS integrates with a honeypot, the whole
system can then capture all attacking activities regardless of
whether they are performed by inside or outside adversaries.
In addition, the data captured by honeypots can be used to
create countermeasures, e.g. the automated intrusion response
systems (AIRS) often uses honeypots as the data capture
infrastructure [7].
Honeypots are often used to investigate currently-unknown
attacks [5], [8]. The Blackhat community is intelligent enough
to create new-unknown threats. A good way to investigate new
threats is to capture the malicious activity step-by-step as it
compromises a system. Honeypots therefore can add value
to research by providing a sacrificial system to be attacked.
Furthermore, it is worth observing what the adversaries do in
the compromised system, such as communicating with other
attackers and uploading new rootkits. Also, honeypots can
effectively capture automated attacks [9], [10]. Due to the
fact that automated attacks often target the entire network,
honeypots can quickly capture them for investigation.
Hence, according to different security requirements, a
variety of honeypots have been proposed, i.e. there is not
only dedicated honeypot software [11], but also complex
cooperative honeypot systems, such as honeynets [12] and
hybrid systems [10], [9], [13], etc. However, there is a lack
of a distinct method that can quickly catch the key points
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of the various honeypots and that can discover new insights,
and advance research and development in this area. Our work
proposes to address these problems. The main contributions
of this paper can be summarized as follows:
 Two essential elements (decoy and security program)
of a honeypot are captured. How these are organized
is described, and this can provide a general view for
analyzing diverse honeypot systems.
 A novel decoy and security program (D-P) based
taxonomy is proposed to investigate different aspects of
honeypot technology.
 Several development trends are identified by comparing
honeypots according to the taxonomy.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows:
Section 2 defines the core concepts and terminology; Section 3
proposes a way to investigate different honeypot technologies
by providing a novel D-P based taxonomy; Section 4 surveys
a number of honeypots based on the taxonomy in order to
analyze their development; Section 5 makes a conclusion.
II. HONEYPOT ANATOMY
The first idea about honeypot comes from a book titled
“The Cuckoo’s Egg” [14] that described a series of events
about tracking a hacker. The second material about honeypot
was reported in a whitepaper [15]. The definition of honeypot
was proposed by Spitzner [16]: “A honeypot is an information
system resource whose value lies in the unauthorized or illicit
use of that resource.” However, it is more like a description
of honeypot from its application value. We therefore provide
a clear definition of what is a honeypot (see Figure 1).
Decoy:
Security Program :
Tight coupling Loose coupling
Honeypot = +
Fig. 1. Honeypot Anatomy: core elements and their organizations.
A honeypot includes two essential elements, decoys and
security programs, and it is used to deliberately sacrifice
its information resource allowing unauthorized and illicit
usage for security investigation. The decoy can be any kind
of information system resource, and the security program
facilitates the security related functions, such as attack
monitoring, prevention, detection, response and profiling. In
addition, the security program should be running in stealthy
to avoid being detected. Among the existing honeypot projects
and honeypot research work, the terminology meanings were
not consistent. Some refer to decoys as honeypots. For
example, a decoy can be a fake digital entity. The terminology
for digital entity acting as decoy is honeytoken [16]. In the
book “The Cuckoo’s Egg”, Stoll deployed the honeytokens,
i.e.,digital files, with security program to track a German
hacker. Thus, the honeytoken is decoy, but Stoll’s system is
a honeypot system. Our definition clarifies that a vulnerable
system without any security program is only a decoy rather
than a honeypot, unless it is equipped with security program
then we call it honeypot.
The organization of the two essential elements can be
roughly categorised into two coupling degrees: loose and
tight (see Figure 1). Coupling refers to the degree of direct
knowledge that one component has of another. Loose coupling
is one in which each component has, or makes use of, little
or no knowledge of the definitions of other separate ones.
It enables components to remain completely autonomous and
unaware of each other while still interfacing with each. In
contrast, tight coupling is when a group of components are
highly dependent on one another, or they are built into the
same impartible unit to perform the task. The independent
honeypot refers to the one using tight coupling, and the
cooperative honeypot indicates the one using loose coupling.
Nawrocki et al. [11] surveyed a number of honeypot software
that are independent honeypots, while complex systems such
as the honeynets [12] and hybrid systems [10], [9], [13]
are cooperative honeypots. In this paper, we use the term
“honeypot” and “honeypot system” interchangeably.
III. REVIEW WITH D-P BASED TAXONOMY
This section proposes a novel D-P based taxonomy as
Figure 2 shows. The terminology is described by a technical
approach, which can make their definitions distinct and easy
to understand. The classification scheme are divided into
two categories. The first category includes the features of
a decoy, and the second one consists of the functions of a
security program. The D-P based taxonomy is used as a basic
conceptual model in order to investigate honeypot technology.
Under this taxonomy framework, we review the typical
honeypots and those specific honeypot-related techniques.
A. Features of decoy
Decoy aims to capture data by being attacked. There are
several primitive characteristics that can compose the design
specification of a decoy.
1) Fidelity: It denotes the degree of exactness of an
information system resource that the decoy provides to the
attack. It is a criterion used to classify the interaction into
three levels: low, medium, high (see Figure 3).
Application
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Fig. 3. Three types of fidelity.
Low-interaction honeypot (LIH) only provides a little
interaction to adversaries. The decoy of LIH always has
another name, facade. A traditional LIH, e.g. Honeyd [17],
is a program emulating the protocols of operating systems
with a limited subset of the full functionality. An adversary
is not able to compromise a LIH because there is only OS
fingerprinting artifice instead of real operating system on the
LIH. A LIH system can provide security program to monitor
the facade in order to capture the network activity.
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Fig. 2. D-P based Taxonomy of honeypot systems.
Medium-interaction honeypot (MIH) can provide much
more interaction to the adversaries. However, unlike to LIH,
MIH does not implement TCP/IP stacks by themselves.
Instead, MIHs, e.g. Dionaea [18] and Cowrie [19], bind on
sockets and leave the operating system do the connection
management. In contrast with LIHs that implement network
protocols, the simulation algorithm of MIHs is based on
emulating logical application responses for incoming requests.
Thus, the request arriving to the MIH will be watched and
examined, and the fake responses will also be created by the
security program of the MIH.
High-interaction honeypot (HIH) is fully functional
system which can be completely compromised by adversaries.
Its decoy is often a genuine system, such as Argos [8] and
Cuckoo Sandbox [20]. Because the fully functional honeypot
can be compromised, the HIH must equip security toolkits for
system activity capture and outgoing traffic containment.
A hybrid honeypot system often consists of decoys
of different interaction levels, e.g. Artail’s hybrid honeypot
framework [9], and Bailey’s [10] and Lengyel’s [13] hybrid
honeypot architectures. In a hybrid system, the LIHs or
MIHs are often used as front ends for large-scale deployment
and the HIHs are used as back ends for deep investigation.
Those distributed front ends are named sinkholes, which
could be the devices (i.e. sensors, redirectors, etc.), such as
network telescopes [21], darknet [22], blackholes [23], IMS
[24], and iSinks [25], or software artifice assigned with a
portion of routed IP address space. Instead of deploying a
large number of HIHs across multiple networks, they can be
centrally deployed in a consolidated location, which is called
honeyfarm, such as the one used in Potemkin [26].
2) Scalability: it represents the capability to provide a
growing amount of decoys, or its potential to be enlarged
to accommodate that growth. It can be classified into two
categories: unscalable and scalable. An unscalable honeypot
only includes a certain number (one or more) of decoys and
cannot change the number, e.g. Argos [8] can only monitor
one virtual decoy. On the contrary, A scalable honeypot system
can deploy multiple decoys and its security program is able to
monitor those decoys simultaneously, e.g. Honeyd [17] is able
to emulate multiple OS fingerprinting artifice at the same time.
A honeynet is a type of scalable honeypot system. The term of
honeynet was proposed by the work [12], [27], which defines
that a honeynet is a network consisting of high interaction
honeypots that provide real systems, applications, and services
for adversaries to interact with. Besides, the data captured by
the scalable honeypots deployed in multiple domains often
need to be collected by secure channel and stored in an isolated
data center for further analysis.
3) Adaptability: it refers to the reconfiguration capability
to adapt the state of the decoy to changed circumstances.
It has two levels: static and dynamic. Traditional static
honeypots, e.g. Specter [28] and Dionaea [18], need the
security researcher to determine the configuration beforehand
and manually reconfigure it later. This static configuration
scheme has several drawbacks: 1) it is a complex task to
manually configure honeypots; 2) the static configuration
scheme is not able to make an instant response to the intrusion
event in time; 3) it is not able to adapt to the change of
the objective cloned network timely. In contrast, a dynamic
honeypot is able to timely adapt to the specific events. It
is able to change the configuration periodically or even in
real-time to adapt to the environment changes and respond to
the intrusion events, e.g. Honeyd [17] and Glastopf [29].
4) Role: it describes in which side the decoy plays within
a multi-tier architecture. A honeypot can play two roles:
server and client. It refers to whether a honeypot actively
detects malicious program or passively captures unauthorized
traffic. Most honeypots are server side ones, e.g. Honeyd
[17] and Dionaea [18], which passively wait being attacked.
Adversaries find these honeypots on their own initiative and
probe and attack them. Most server-side honeypots never
advertise themselves, but some can “advertise” themselves,
e.g. Glastopf [29] works like a normal web server with a
number of ever requested vulnerable paths and scripts (that are
referred to dorks) so that the attackers can index them by using
search engine and web crawler. A client honeypot is used
to investigate the client-side intrusion. This type of honeypot
can actively initiate requests to servers and investigate the
malicious program on the server side, such as Ghost [30].
5) Physicality / Virtuality (P/V): it denotes the state of
decoys as they actually exist, which can be divided into two
categories: physical and virtual. A physical honeypot refers
to a genuine computer system running on a physical machine
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and acting as a decoy. Indeed, physical honeypot often
implies high-interaction but could have higher performance
than virtual HIH. However, it is infeasible to deploy physical
honeypots for each IP address in a large address space. The
contrary concept is virtual honeypot that uses virtual decoys
that need the host machine to respond to the network traffic
sent to the virtual decoys [31]. We can have multiple virtual
honeypots hosted concurrently by one physical machine.
Though according to the definition of honeypot, any type
of information system resource can be deployed as decoy, the
use of virtualization technologies has important advantages
in terms of ease of management and maintenance. On one
hand, all the LIHs and MIHs are virtual honeypots according
to their nature of design. The decoys of LIHs are software
artifice, which emulate the fingerprints of operating systems
and services. On the other hand, the HIHs can be virtualized
by using virtualization technologies. Galan et al. [32]
summarised the virtualization technology evolution through
three categories: baseline virtualization, testbed oriented
virtualization and datacenter oriented virtualization. Figure 4
shows the development of the virtualization technologies used
in deploying HIHs in the last 17 years (dates are approximate).
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Fig. 4. Virtualization technologies for decoy deployment
For the HIHs using the baseline virtualization technologies,
the first example is that the User-Mode Linux (UML) was used
as the virtualization engine to mimic the Gen II Honeynet
in [33], where the host machine runs the Honeywall to
contain and monitor the entire virtual honeynet. The host
can apply the built-in tty logging mechanism to capture
the keystroke of the honeypots silently. However, the UML
only enables Linux kernel-based virtual machines to run as
an application within a normal Linux host. Instead, Abbasi
and Harris [34] used VMware server to deploy virtual Gen
III Honeynet, which can support various operation systems
based on x86 architecture. Different from the previous work,
it applied a multi-system virtual honeynet architecture that
installs the Honeywall on a separate singe virtual machine
instead of the host. It also used the Sebek to perform system
activity capture in the virtual honeypots. Similarly, the KVM
(Kernel-based Virtual Machine) hypervisor can also provide
the emulation for different operation systems. Capalik’s system
[35] used the low-level surveillance of the KVM hypervisor
to stealthily monitor the system activity from outside of
the virtual machine, which results in the attacks having
no way to bypass the surveillance. Recently, some novel
lightweight virtualization technologies provide alternatives to
the hypervisor-based virtualization for honeypot deployment.
For example, Memari et al. [36] created virtual honeynet based
on the LXC (Linux Containers), which can simultaneously
create multiple Linux user-space instances through partitioning
the resource of the host. The LXC based virtual machine can
startup very fast but it can only emulate Linux over Linux.
Another case in point is the honeypot [37] created using
Docker, which can implements a high-level API to provide
lightweight containers that run processes in isolation. The
Docker container is even more lightweight than the LXC
container since it implements the application virtualization
rather than a full system virtualization.
Because it is a complex task to manually generate all the low
level details for the creation of medium-to-big size honeypot
scenarios, several testbed oriented virtualization technologies
were proposed, which can be used to deploy virtual HIHs.
VNUML (Virtual Network User Mode Linux) [38] proposed
a high-level description for virtual honeynet and developed
a tool to process that description automatically avoiding the
user to deal with the complex low-level details. However, it
only focuses on using the UML as its underlying technology
so it still can only emulate Linux kernel-based virtual
machines. Furthermore, some generic tools that integrate
multiple virtual machine hypervisors were also proposed.
NoSE (Network Simulation Environment) [39] addressed
the multi-hypervisor issue through integrating a variety of
virtual machine hypervisors, such as UML, Xen and QEMU,
into one generic platform. The drawback of NoSE and the
previous proposals is that they lack the capability of dynamic
configuration for the honeynet deployment. VNX [40] is a
more powerful generic virtualized tool, which integrates more
hypervisors, such as UML, QEMU, KVM, LXC etc, and can
even undertake dynamic configuration. Following the idea of
VNX, Fan et al. proposed the Honeyvers [41] framework
aimed to create and manage heterogeneous honeypots.
Apart from the tools described above, some other
multi-tenant datacenter oriented virtualization technologies for
HIHs deployment were also proposed. Honeylab [42] provides
a platform to share IP address space and computing resources.
It is an overlay of distributed infrastructure which allows
security researchers to create their own desired honeypot
systems without setting up distributed sensors in various
geographical locations. DarkNOC [43] is designed to collect
interesting traffic from different information sources, e.g.
NetFlow, Snort, and Nepenthes, to analyze the data and present
it to users in an efficient manner. In addition, Han et al.
proposed the HoneyMix [44] system that treats honeypot as a
network security function and instantiates honeypots by using
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) technique.
6) Deployment Strategy: it presents the pertinence tactics
of deploying the decoy(s). There are five common decoy
deployment strategies: sacrificial lamb, deception ports,
proximity decoys, minefield and redirection shield.
Sacrificial lamb is often a normal system without
connections to production networks, and waits to be
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compromised by attacks, e.g. Argos [8] and Cuckoo Sandbox
[20]. It can be a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) computer,
a router, or a switch etc. The typical implementation involves
loading the operating system, configuring some applications
and then leaving it on the network to see what happens.
Sacrificial lambs provide a mean to analyze a compromised
system down to the last byte with no possible variation. The
analysis often requires numerous third-party tools. They also
do not provide integrated traffic containment facilities, so will
require additional network considerations.
Deception ports on production systems indicate simulated
services disguised as well-known services. These are basically
LIHs or MIHs, such as Specter [28] and Dionaea [18], which
mimic various services on different ports of the system, e.g.
HTTP is mimicked on port 80. These honeypots first “observe”
the operating system they reside on and then portray these
services according to that. The basic idea is deception so that
the adversaries are “stuck-up” in solving the deception and
they can be knocked down from the network.
Proximity decoys indicate that the decoys are deployed on
the same network as production systems and possibly clone
the configuration of the production systems. There will be
no legal hassles to monitor the decoys. Because they are
part of the same subnet where the production servers are
included, and it is allowed to monitor any activity pertaining
to your own network. Also, once they are in proximity to other
production systems, you have ease in either re-routing traffic to
the honeypots when some malicious attack is detected on the
production systems, or trapping that attack. Honeyd [17] can
use the free IP addresses of a certain production network to
deploy and integrate the decoys into the production network,
which exactly follows this deployment strategy.
Minefield means deploying a relatively large number of
honeypots at the perimeter or the forefront of the protected
network to act as landmines that “explode upon contact”, by
which we mean switch on the data capture function upon
contact. Any scans or vulnerability detectors can exploit the
contents of honeypots, sparing the production servers. So this
deployment strategy can be used to capture a large amount of
data. As stated, IDSs are placed at the perimeter, where they
can use the contents of honeypots to reduce the probability
of generating false alarms. Sinkholes, e.g. network telescopes
[21], often uses this deployment strategy.
Redirection shield uses port redirection or traffic re-routing
to forward the malicious data to the honeypots. This strategy
needs the intrusion detection technology to evaluate the
network traffic. If the traffic is interesting, it will be redirected
into the honeypot shield to avoid the production system being
attacked. Also, the shield and the production network should
be coupled, tightly or loosely. The honeypots can reside in
the same address space of the production network or reside
on another subnet alongside the production network or even
remotely. For example, Shadow Honeypots [5] following this
deployment strategy use the shadow application as a shield
dealing with the malicious traffic for anomaly-based detection.
7) Resource Type: it denotes the type of information
system resource available for the attacks. Most honeypots
provide or emulate general attacked resources, which are
aimed at detection of more than one attack technique.
Currently, many specific attacked resource oriented honeypot
systems have been proposed, which can be defined as follows:
Web application honeypots are tools aimed at detection of
attacks on web application, e.g. Glastopf [29];
VoIP honeypots are used to capture threats in internet
telephony (Voice over IP), e.g. Artemisa [45];
SSH honeypots are oriented on secure shell (SSH) attacks,
e.g. Cowrie [19];
Bluetooth honeypots are aimed to capture the attacks
propagating through the Bluetooth device, such as the
Bluepot [46];
USB honeypots are used to investigate arbitrary malware on
USB storage devices, e.g. Ghost USB Honeypot [30];
SCADA/ICS honeypots emulate industrial control system
resources, e.g. Conpot [47];
IoT honeypots are used to capture the attacks that target IoT
devices, such as the IoTPOT [48];
IPv6 network honeypots are tools used to capture attacks
targeting IPv6 networks, e.g. Hyhoneydv6 [49].
B. Functions of security program
As previously stated, the security program aims to carry out
all the security related functions, such as attack monitoring,
prevention, detection, response and profiling. This subsection
describes all these function in detail.
1) Attack Monitoring: it is aimed to log all the intrusion
events and malicious behaviors to allow a further investigation.
Two critical layers of data can be identified: network activity
(every inbound and outbound, connection, packet and its
header information as well as its payload, etc.), and system
activity (keystroke, system call, rootkits, etc.).
Surveying the techniques for capturing and collecting
network data, particularly in the case of cooperative honeypots
from distributed decoys, two widely used network data
forwarding methods are found: tunneling and application-level
proxying. Tunneling is used when some distributed decoys,
such as network telescopes, darknet, and blackholes, are placed
in a different location where the processing backends are. As
the decoys are assigned a portion of routed IP address space
corresponding to its physical location, a tunnel mechanism
based on a tunneling protocol like GRE has to be used to
transport data packets to the backends. By using tunnels,
the decoy backends seem to be directly deployed in the
production network, being the tunnel almost invisible to
“traceroute”, although the tunnel will add some latency and
modify the MTU. Some hybrid systems [26], [50] uses GRE
tunnel to forward the inbound data from the frontends to the
backends. Application-level proxying consist of transporting
the content of the packets to the backends by means of
application specific proxies. The application-level proxies are
also known as application-level gateways, and are available
for common Internet services, e.g. an HTTP proxy is used for
Web access and an FTP proxy is used for file transfers. Honeyd
[17] provides an application-level proxying functionality. For
instance, on TCP port 23, Honeyd can be configured to
automatically proxy traffic to another machine’s Telnet port.
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In contrast, the generic so called “circuit-level” proxies (that
conceptually work at the session layer of the OSI model) give
support to multiple applications. For example, SOCKS is and
IP-based circuit-level proxy server that supports applications
using TCP and UDP. Application-level proxies provide better
support for the additional capabilities of each protocol than
circuit-level ones do (e.g. application-level proxies can better
support virus scanning). Also, they are client-neutral and
require no special software components or operating system
on the client computer to enable the client to communicate
with servers through the proxy.
On the other hand, system activity monitoring needs
capturing the malicious activity in HIHs. According to the
requirement of stealthy capturing, some approaches have
been proposed. Sebek [51] and Qebek [52] are examples
of the first monitoring tools used to capture the system
activity in honeypots. They modify the system kernel by
adding new kernel modules that capture system activity in a
supposedly hard to detect way. However, there are nowadays
some techniques can detect the presence of this type of
kernel modules installed inside the honeypots. The well-known
CWSandbox [53] uses the in-line code overwriting approach
to hook the API function in order to observe the malware
behavior without being noticed. However, this approach still
has the possibility of being detected.
In order to address this drawback, Jiang and Wang
[54] proposed another monitoring approach called
“out-of-the-box”, which uses the virtualization hypervisor
to monitor the activity in guest virtual machines (VM).
VMI-Honeymon [13] uses a Volatility extension to call the
API of the Xen Access successor LibVMI to access the
memory of the guest VM. LibVMI [55] is a C library with
Python bindings based virtual machine introspection which
can support a variety of virtual machine hypervisors, such as
Xen, KVM, etc. It is easy to monitor the low-level details of a
running virtual honeypot by viewing its memory trapping on
hardware events and accessing the vCPU registers. There are
some other virtual machine introspection based approaches
that can analyze malware and meanwhile make it harder for
the malware to detect them, such as Livewire [56], VMScope
[54], Lares [57], VMWatcher [58], etc. However, only some
of them are open-source projects and still maintained, which
are listed in Table I that compares their supported hypervisors
and operating systems.
TABLE I
VIRTUAL HONEYPOT INTROSPECTION SOLUTIONS
Solution VM Hypervisor Supported OS
Argos [8] QEMU Windows
Nitro [59] QEMU Windows
Timescope [60] QEMU Linux
Virtuoso [61] QEMU Windows, Linux, OS X, Haiku
DRAKVUF [62] Xen Windows
Cuckoo [20] KVM Windows, Linux, OS X, Android
2) Attack Prevention: it is aimed to deter or block
intrusion. This function can be carried out by several
approaches: data filtering, tarpitting and containment.
Filtering consists of discarding the data traffic which is
typically specified by means of filtering rules. Basically, there
are two filtering mechanisms: source-destination based and
content based. On one hand, the source-destination based
filtering mechanism examines the header information (mainly
source and destination addresses and ports and protocol) of
each packet to make the discarding decision. This mechanism
is effective at reducing the amount of repeated traffic into a
non-redundant manageable data. iSinks [25] uses a filtering
strategy consisting of analyzing the connections established
with the first N destination IPs per every source IP. Pang et al.
[63] improved the filtering mechanisms taking into account,
for example, the source port, destination and connection.
Bailey et al. [64] improved the source-destination based
filtering mechanism through expanding the individual darknets
into multiple darknets for observing the global behavior and
the source distribution. On the other hand, content based
filtering mechanism consist of inspecting the content or
payload of the packets to make discarding decision. Bailey et
al. [10] proposed content prevalence as a filtering mechanism
by inspecting the first packet including new payload. Content
prevalence analyzes the distribution of content sequences in
payloads, and can generate alert when a specific piece of
content sequence becomes widely prevalent. Similarly, IMS
[24] proposed a caching mechanism to avoid record duplicated
payload through recording the first payload packets in order
to reduce disk utilization. A potential drawback of packet
inspection based filtering mechanism is that it will be unable
to make decision until the session has been established and
at least the first packet of content or payload has been
received. Also, SweetBait [65] uses whitelists to filter the
traffic matching benevolent patterns to conduct zero-day worm
detection. RolePlayer [66] can emulate both the client and
the server side of an application session in order to replay
and filter variant well-known attacks. Shadow honeypot [5]
uses signature-based IDS to filter the well-known attacks and
then applies anomaly-based IDS to filter the input into suspect
traffic for further investigation.
Tarpitting consists of purposely slow down the attacking
progress, worm propagation, virus sprawl, etc. Collapsar’s
[67] tarpit module restricts the outgoing attack from the
honeypot by throttling the packet rate sent. Honeywall [68]
is also a tarpit device that can limit the number of outgoing
connections. It can block any outbound connections in the
case it is capturing automated attacks, or when investigating
manual attacks, it can be programmed to allow some outbound
connections, such as 5 to 10 connections per hour. However,
the brute strict data tarpitting will raise the adversary’s
suspicion, as well as bringing the chance of being detected,
which will lead to impede data capture.
Containment is another approach to prevent the
adversary to use the compromised honeypots to attack
other non-Honeypot systems, through confining the attack
in the honeypot environment. In order to reduce the risk
of being detected, it redirects the outbound attacks back to
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other honeypots, rather than limiting the number of outgoing
connections or discarding them. Alata et al. [69] implemented
such outgoing connection redirection mechanism through
modifying the Linux system kernel. Whereas, the outgoing
traffic redirection has some drawback as well: it uses
the “in-the-box” approach, which allows some advanced
adversaries to detect the redirection module.
3) Attack Detection: this function aims to detect intrusion
and generate alerts. Commonly, there are two detection
approaches: signature-based and anomaly-based.
Signature-based detection is based on detecting the
well-known attacks by recognizing malicious patterns. This
approach is often used in production environments to discover
unauthorised activity and generate alerts to the administrator.
Unlike the production traffic captured by IDSs, the traffic
received by honeypots will almost always correspond to
malicious activities, as the honeypots have no production
value. Attack detection honeypots therefore have a highly
reduced false alarm rate. This type of honeypot is often called
production honeypot and is aimed to emulate well-known
vulnerabilities to lure intrusion so that intruders will be
deceived by being forced to waste time to interact with the
honeypots. Production honeypots are often LIHs and MIHs
that have little or no interaction with the attacker in order to
minimize the risk of infecting other production systems in the
context. Besides, the performance and response time should be
guaranteed for production ones. For example, the production
honeypot Dionaea [18] can simulate multiple well-known
services to carry out signature-based detection.
On the other hand, anomaly-based detection means
detecting unknown attacks by discovering deviations from
normal behaviour patterns. The honeypots using this detection
approach are always used in the research environment as
research honeypots. A research honeypot is designed to
detect anomaly attacks and investigate the unknown signatures.
Thus, research honeypots are often more powerful than
production honeypots. HIHs and hybrid honeypot systems
are always used as research ones to provide full functional
systems. A wider assortment of data can be captured to
facilitate further investigation for many purposes. Also,
research honeypots are a step ahead than production ones.
The signature of new attack generated by research ones
are often used to serve the production ones for attack
detection. This can lead to early warning and prediction
of future attacks and exploits. At present, a number of
anomaly-based detection techniques have been proposed in the
context of honeypot research. For example, Argos [8] applies
the dynamic taint analysis [70] to detect zero-day attacks
and meanwhile generate the new signatures, Honeycomb
[71] uses the longest common substring (LCS) algorithm
to detect repeating patterns in order to spot worms, and
Bailey’s system[10] performs system behavior profiling by
comparing the infected virtual filesystem to the uninfected one.
In addition, some current learning techniques, such as the deep
learning approach for NIDS [72], can also be used in decoy so
as to acquire new detection skills for identify unknown attacks.
Apart from the traditional IDS techniques, Sekar et al. [73]
proposed the Specification-based Anomaly Detection approach
using the supervised method to develop specification, instead
of using unsupervised machine learning techniques, in order
to identify legitimate behaviors and detect unknown attacks
as deviation from a norm. It improves the effectiveness of
anomaly detection that lacks in signature-based approaches,
but also minimizes the large number of false positive produced
by anomaly-based techniques.
4) Attack Response: it relates to the measures taken to
respond to attacks or adapt to intrusion events in terms of
certain requirements. Basically, honeypots can take two type
of reactions: traffic redirection and decoy reconfiguration.
a) Traffic redirection: it is used to control how the
traffic is sent to the appropriate destination. For example,
hybrid honeypots redirects the malicious traffic from LIH to
isolated HIH for further investigation. We mainly take into
account two redirection techniques: Flow-based routing and
TCP connection replaying.
Flow-based routing is the routing technique where packets
are routed from source to destination, based on selecting
the path that satisfies some requirements such as QoS, load
balance, security, etc. This mechanism is based on the same
principles used for normal routing in networks, but it is applied
to more specific data flows. Kohler et al. proposed the flexible
and configurable Click modular router, which is made of
simple packet processing modules which are combined in a
service chain in order to build complex and efficient network
services that can be used in this case to do flow based routing
[74]. There are several cooperative honeypot systems using
Click framework to facilitate the data control. For example,
the Potemkin gateway router and the GQ gateway are based on
the Click modular router. In addition, with the rapid growth of
software-defined networking (SDN), OpenFlow was designed
to allow users to programmatically control real switches (from
companies like Cisco, HP, etc.) by means of applications
running on SDN controller frameworks. The SDN controller
can facilitate a fine-grained dynamic control of traffic by
means of the flow table entries configured on each OpenFlow
based switches. In the near future, the programmable SDN
based network architectures will increasingly take the role of
the data control for honeypot systems [75].
TCP connection replaying is a connection handover
technique aimed to seamlessly transfer one TCP socket
endpoint from one node to another node. When an interesting
connection is established between the attacker and the
LIH, a TCP connection handoff mechanism is needed to
redirect the connection from the LIH to a HIH for further
investigation. It transfers the established TCP state of the
socket endpoint from the original node to the new one,
and then the new node can continue the conversation with
the other TCP endpoint directly. Bailey’s system [10] uses
a connection handoff mechanism for traffic redirection. In
order to avoid conserving the state of every connection,
the connection handoff mechanism makes the redirection
decision based on the first payload packet of each connection.
However, the author did not unveil the technical detail about
the connection handoff. Similarly, Honeybrid gateway [76]
uses the connection replay mechanism to implement traffic
transparent redirection between LIHs and HIHs. Nevertheless,
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Honeybrid revealed the technical details of the gateway, which
is a TCP replay proxy using libnetfilter queue [77] to process
packets. The connection handoff mechanism based on TCP
replay is able to provide stealthy redirection for automated
malwares. In [78], Lin et al. proposed a transparent and secure
network environment which can allow the automated malwares
to attack or propagate, but under a stealthy control. Although
the TCP/IP stateful traffic replay can facilitate transparent TCP
connection handoff, it cannot solve the identical-fingerprint
problem, which means the LIH and HIH have different
fingerprints (e.g. IP and MAC addresses). This problem
leaves the opportunity to the skilled adversaries to detect the
honeypot environment. VMI-Honeymon [79] provided a novel
solution that retains the MAC and IP address of the original
HIH for cloned HIHs but creates separate network bridges to
isolate them so as to avoid address collisions. Most recently,
Fan and Ferna´ndez [80] proposed a novel SDN based stealthy
TCP connection handover mechanism that solved this problem
through using different ports of OpenFlow based switch to
isolate the honeypots with identical-fingerprint.
b) Decoy reconfiguration: it is designed to timely adapt
decoy’s state to specific events, which could be intrusion
events, state variation of objective targets, etc. As stated,
static honeypot system lacks the capability to reconfigure the
decoy in time. That is a critical disadvantage in the complex
and dynamic network scenarios where the honeypots are
deployed. Several approaches have been proposed to address
this problem, which can be roughly categorised into dynamic
cloning and dynamic catering.
Dynamic cloning is aimed to synchronously emulate the
real production targets including network topology, operating
system fingerprints, services, open ports, etc. It is designed
to rapidly revolutionize the configuration and deployment by
monitoring and learning the target organization networks in
real time. Thus, the dynamic cloning has two phases. The first
phase is called network discovery which is used to collect
the information of target network. The second phase is called
honeypot deployment which refers to deploy decoys emulating
the target systems. There are two ways to discover the targets:
passive and active fingerprinting. Hecker et al. [81] discussed
both the two ways for the network discovery and automated
honeynet cloning. Passive fingerprinting tools, such as p0f
[82], can sniff the traffic, determine active systems and open
ports in the target scenario, and meanwhile make little traffic
noise. However, the main problem of this approach is that
it does not discover the systems that do not generate any
production traffic. Instead, active probing tools, such as Nmap
[83], can discover all open ports on the objective system, even
if there is no production traffic to those ports, at the price of
generating some extra production traffic. In [9], a dynamic
hybrid honeypot systems is proposed for intrusion detection.
It consists of a combination of LIHs and HIHs, and relies on
active probing to get information of the organization networks
for emulation. In the network discovery phase, the active
probing tool Nmap [83] is used to determine the active systems
and open ports. Then in the honeypot deployment phase,
LIHs are created periodically by Honeyd [17] to represent the
production systems, and it also used virtual HIHs to receive
the redirected traffic from LIHs, but the dynamic deployment
of HIHs was not mentioned.
Dynamic catering is used to create catering honeypots
for certain attacks, gradually escalating interaction level for
malicious data capture, redeploying the honeypots when
intrusion activity is detected. It follows the idea of creating and
deploying the honeypots on demand timely to increase data
capture efficiency. Potemkin [26] used dynamically created
HIHs on physical servers to achieve efficient resources usage.
It employs a network gateway, to which routers all over the
Internet are configured to tunnel an address prefix, as an
agent to take responsibility of sending traffic to a honeyfarm
server. The gateway instructs the virtual machine monitor
(VMM) that runs on each physical server to create a new
HIH on demand for each active destination IP address.
Otherwise, if one HIH is idle, the VMM will destroy it
and reclaim the resources when being instructed by the
gateway. Similarly, VMI-Honeymon [79] clone VMs through
restoring the memory snapshot with configuration on a QEMU
copy-on-write (qcow2) filesystem. The newly created virtual
HIH runs the system and applications in exactly the same
fingerprints with the cloned one to investigate the attacks.
5) Attack Profiling: it is the extrapolation of attack
information in order to analyze malicious activity, as well
as unveiling the intrusion motives. McGrew and Vaughn, Jr.
[84] ever indicated that an attack profile should contain these
following attributes:
Motivation describes the reason of the attack;
Breadth/Depth presents the scope of the attack and the
degree of the impact to the attacked system;
Sophistication shows the level of technical expertise to carry
out the attack;
Concealment describes the measures used for hiding the
evidence of the attack;
Attacker(s) defines the role behind the attack: individual or
a group of adversaries, or at least identifies the source of
the attack, e.g. automated malware;
Vulnerability is the flaw that can be exploited by the attack;
Tools are the software used to carry out attacks, including
shellcodes, back-doors, rootkits, and other software
uploaded to the system to perform the rest of the attack.
Among these attributes, some can be achieved by directly
applying the captured honeypot data. Through statistically
analyzing the log information, including the attack source,
destination and frequency, as well as the infection degree
on the HIH, we can identify the breadth and the depth of
the attack separately. Also, the concealment and tools can be
displayed through observing the adversary’s activity on the
honeypot. We call this approach using basic statistics on the
log information is direct information based attack profiling.
Some honeypots, e.g. Honeyd [17] and Dionaea [18], do use
the source, destination and timestamp of an attack based on
IP information to described the attack profile.
However, the other attributes have to be revealed by further
derived information. Motivation can be inferred according
to the insights into the activity on HIH. Identifying the
attacker and the sophistication needs in-depth observation and
forensics on the interaction between the attacker and the
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honeypot. The unknown vulnerabilities often need advanced
detection techniques. Therefore, derived information based
attack profiling is much more complex, since it tries to access
and explain the fundamental cause of the attack. For this
purpose, basic statistics do not suffice any more, it is necessary
to apply interdisciplinary approaches, e.g. association rule
mining, neuronal networks, virtual machine introspection,
etc. Currently, plenty of techniques have been presented to
analyze the malicious data: Nawrocki et al. [11] reviewed
the approaches for honeypot data analysis; Egele et al. [85]
surveyed the automated dynamic malware analysis techniques
and tools; Rieck et al. [86] presented the research on honeypot
system behavior analysis through machine learning.
C. The design space and constraints
Depending on the classification scheme, the honeypot
designer can theoretically gain at most 103680 different
combinations of classes, which can provide a global view of
design space of homogeneous honeypots. However, we have
to note that there are several mutual restrictions between some
features (see Fig. 5) that can lead to the design space shrink.
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Fig. 5. Constraints between main features
From the point of view of resisting attacks, malicious data
can be captured through honeypots being probed, attacked
and compromised, which are exactly corresponding to the
three phases of cyber attack, i.e. probe, exploit and violate.
Attacks always begin at probing large-scale IP networks in
order to find vulnerable objectives, and then they exploit the
vulnerabilities to compromise the objectives, and finally, if the
compromised systems are worth further utilizing, the adversary
will violate them, e.g. install rootkits, setup backdoors, and
launch new attacks etc. The large-scale probing will produce
high network traffic load but it will not translate into a useful
system activity. Then a part of the probed systems which
have vulnerabilities will be attacked. So, in the exploiting
phase, the scale of attacking objectives is reduced, but the
data quality is enhanced, i.e. attacking traffic will include
malicious payload. In the violating phase, only a small part of
compromised systems or even several specific objectives will
be involved, and the data quality become very high because
any unauthorized system data is worth recording for further
investigation. Therefore, every phase produces a different data
quantity and quality. The fidelity and scalability features are
highly related with the three attack phases.
However, fidelity and scalability is a pair of
mutual-condition features in a certain type of decoy.
On one hand, for approaching the task of capturing high
quality data, decoy has to escalate the interaction level,
however a higher interaction level will cause a higher risk
of being compromised, so that the honeypot have to enhance
the security program to protect the decoy. On the other hand,
higher interaction guarantees the fidelity but sacrifices the
scalability, which means it will result in failing to capture
adequate data from large-scale IP network spaces. So, it needs
to seek a good balance between those two features in order
to optimize the use of honeypot resources. The cooperative
honeypots, particularly, the hybrid honeypots are developed
to overcome those issues.
Also, according to the above discussion, we can note that
the attack profiling of security program is highly related to
the fidelity of decoy. If the security program wants to perform
attack profiling based on derived information, the decoy needs
high interaction level to derive deep enough information
(i.e. the system activity) about the attack. Otherwise, if the
honeypot is a LIH or MIH, the attack profiling can only use
the direct information.
Furthermore, the adaptability is highly relies on the P/V.
It is observable that physical honeypots are often static,
while the virtualization technology has made it easy to create
dynamic honeypots. The software artifice is the easiest way
to carry out dynamic configuration, and at present, the virtual
machine based HIHs are increasingly convenient to perform
dynamic reconfiguration. So, the decoy reconfiguration of
attack response is also tightly related to the P/V.
Overall, the design space can help predicting the future
honeypot design in theory, while the constraints among
different features can provide a more practical view for the
designer to implement honeypots under specific technical
environment.
IV. HONEYPOT DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
This section surveys a number of typical honeypots,
including the independent and cooperative ones, by applying
the D-P based taxonomy. The comparison of these selected
honeypots is illustrated in Table II. It shows the proposed D-P
based taxonomy can fully classify those different honeypots.
Also, there are some development tendency can be discovered
that will be analyzed in the following subsections.
A. Hybrid honeypots
According to the requirement of decoupling and achieving
the optimization of both the fidelity and scalability, many
cooperative honeypots (particularly, the hybrid honeypots)
have been developed ( see the right part of Table II).
Commonly, a typical hybrid honeypot consists of three
subsystems: frontends, controller and backends. The backends
can be HIHs or honeyfarm, the frontends can be LIHs
(or MIHs) or sinkholes for monitoring large-scale routed
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF HONEYPOT SYSTEMS IN TERMS OF D-P BASED TAXONOMY
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Fidelity
Low                          
Medium                          
High                          
Physicality / Virtuality (P/V)
Physical                          
Virtual
Software artifice                          
VMware                          
UML                          
Xen                          
QEMU                          
KVM                          
Scalability
Unscalable                          
Scalable                          
Adaptability
Static                          
Dynamic                          
Role
Server                          
Client                          
Deployment Strategy
Sacrificial lamb                          
Deception ports                          
Proximity decoys                          
Minefield                          
Redirection shield                          
Resource Type
General                          
Web application                          
VoIP                          
SSH                          
Bluetooth                          
USB                          
SCADA/ICS                          
IoT                          
IPv6 networks                          
Attack Monitoring
Application layer proxying                          
GRE tunneling                          
In-the-box                          
Out-of-the-box                          
Attack Prevention
Source-destination filtering                          
Content filtering                          
Tarpitting                          
Containment                          
Attack Detection
Signature-based                          
Anomaly-based                          
Attack Response
Flow based routing                          
TCP connection replaying                          
Dynamic cloning                          
Dynamic catering                          
Attack Profiling
Direct information                          
Derived information                          
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IP address space, and the controller can be Honeywall,
Click modular router, Honeybrid gateway, etc. These three
subsystems facilitate a number of functions. The frontends
often provide low interaction to the attacks, because their main
objective is to capture network data. However, they need to
discard the uninteresting traffic in order to get fine-grained
data. The controllers are used to perform the functions of data
control as well as system dynamic configuration in a hidden
way. The backends are aimed to perform stealthy system data
capture and perform data analysis such as digital forensics to
unveil the attacks’ skills, tactics and motives. Table III shows
the comparison of subsystems of hybrid honeypots.
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF SUBSYSTEMS OF HYBRID HONEYPOTS
Hybrid honeypot Frontend Controller Backend
Bailey’s system Honeyd A central VMware VM
controller
Artail’s system Honeyd Honeywall Physical machine
GQ Network Click based VMware ESX
telescopes router
SweetBait Honeyd+ - QEMU based Argos
honeycomb
Honeybrid Honeyd Honeybrid VMware VM
gateway
SGNET Honeyd+ SGNET QEMU based Argos
ScriptGen gateway
Li’s system Spamtrap+ - Phoneypot
Phoneybot+
Phoneytoken
VMI-Honeymon Dionaea Honeybrid Xen VM
gateway
IoTPOT Frontend - QEMU based IoTBox
responder
Hyhoneydv6 Honeydv6 - QEMU VM
We discover that Honeyd takes the role of the frontend
in most hybrid honeypots. The wide applications of Honeyd
probably attribute to its advantages of lightweight design,
distributed appearance, programmable artifice and dynamic
feature. Honeyd is a virtual LIH framework which can deploy
multiple decoys concurrently following a certain network
topology. Though it can only emulate LIHs, it still has some
advantages: 1) based on the OS fingerprinting database of
Nmap, it can fabricate decoys with almost all the common
OS fingerprints; 2) the users can implement their own service
fake response through python programming for capturing data.
Honeyd may emulate a service in such a way that it can
actually collect more information than a HIH would; 3) it can
dynamically reconfigure the decoys by using a doorway called
Honeydctl to communicate the inner workings of Honeyd.
Also, a number of controllers have been developed that
mainly provide the security functions, e.g. inbound data
filtering, outbound data containment, dynamic configuration,
etc. Most of them are based on programable frameworks, e.g.
GQ gateway is based on the Click, and Honeybrid gateway
is based on the libnetfilter. These programmable frameworks
allow the developers to implement their own data control
functions according to the specific requirements.
It is also obvious that most hybrid honeypots use virtual
machines to deploy their backends. We can see that the most
popular hypervisors are Xen and QEMU. Many solutions
of dynamic configuration and virtual memory introspection
have been proposed based on them. With the evolvement of
QEMU-KVM, we can also foresee that the KVM will be
in charge of deploying HIHs for the backends. The detail
analysis of virtualization enhancing honeypot development
will be described in the next subsection.
B. Virtual honeypots
In essential, the development of honeypots highly relies on
the progress of virtualization technology. Virtual honeypots
provide several valuable advantages: ease of maintenance,
dynamic configuration and anti-detection.
The virtualization leads to the ease of maintenance. First,
using virtualization technology, one physical machine can host
multiple virtual honeypots simultaneously, which can highly
improve resource efficiency. Second, the time-consuming of
honeypot large-scale deployment has greatly decreased by
using the virtualization techniques that only needs several
minutes, while it often takes several hours to deploy honeypots
by using physical machines, e.g. the physical honeypot
designed by Cliff Stoll in 1986 [14].
The virtualization also facilitates the capability of dynamic
configuration. The dynamic configuration is often used to
reduce the responsive time to specific event. As stated, the
dynamic honeypots can be used to clone the production
systems and synchronize the changes of the production ones
timely, and also, it can be used to investigate intrusion by
modifying its own state according to the attacking research
requirement. For example, the dynamic configuration can
facilitate the redirection containment by redirecting the traffic
back to a dynamically created honeypot, in order to control the
outbound attack rather than using the brute tarpitting approach.
This function also improves the capability of anti-detection,
which will be described in the next paragraph.
Anti-detection is aimed to avoid the honeypot being
detected. The virtualization technology provides several ways
to hide both the decoy and the security program. On one
hand, for hiding the security program, firstly, the virtual
machine memory introspection facilitates the “out-of-the-box”
monitoring approach, which improves the stealthy monitoring
capability for HIHs. Secondly, as mentioned above, because
the brute tarpitting approach is easy to be detected by a
skilled adversary, dynamic honeypot systems often redirect
the outbound traffic back into the honeynet for anti-detection.
On the other hand, for limited-functional honeypots, the
anti-detecting will focus on camouflaging the fact that the
decoy is a honeypot. For example, due to the link latency of
Honeyd based decoy can be used to detect the fact, Fu et al.
[90] improved the Honeyd through reducing the link latency
in order to camouflage the Honeyd based decoy. Additionally,
if a decoy has been detected, the inbound traffic rate to the
honeypot will be reduced [91], so in this case, the system can
redeploy the decoy for performing anti-detection.
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C. Special purpose honeypots
As stated, an increasing number of special purpose
honeypots [86], [47], [48], [49] have been developed. Firstly,
both the independent honeypots and the cooperative honeypots
are focusing on developing specific attacked resource oriented
honeypots. Because these honeypots focus on fully emulating
one type of information resource so that they have a higher
opportunity to get fine-grained data. With the rapid growth of
cyberspace, the SCADA/ICS and IoT facilities are also faced
with various cyber threats every day. As stated, corresponding
honeypots for those areas are also developed. Thus, the
tendency of honeypot development is closely related to the
industrial production as well. Secondly, research honeypots,
particularly, for anomaly-detection and attack profiling, have
become increasingly numerous, which highly relies on the
cutting-edge technologies of other sciences, such as machine
learning, big data analysis, etc. That is because honeypot is
a rapidly developing interdisciplinary field that often needs
expertise over various disciplines.
V. CONCLUSION
As an emerging and rapidly developing interdisciplinary,
honeypot has become a hot research in the field of computer
and network security. From a variety of honeypot systems, we
captured two common essential elements, decoy and security
program. We discovered the decoupling trend of the two
elements’ organization. Though the capability of a honeypot
has become increasingly augmented, the coupling trend has
been evolving from tight to loose in order to reduce the
risk that a change made within one components will create
unanticipated changes within others.
Furthermore, based on the core concept, a novel D-P
based taxonomy of honeypot systems is proposed, which
can help to distinctly investigate the honeypot systems and
techniques. Thanks to the taxonomy, we specialised in various
decoy features and reviewed a number of honeypot related
technologies in interdisciplinary and cutting-edge sciences.
Broadly speaking, current honeypot development includes
two vital parts: independent honeypots and cooperative
honeypots. So, on one hand, owing to the advantages of
lightweight design, low-cost development, easy management,
resource efficiency, etc, the independent honeypots have
a steady development and various application scenarios,
e.g. numerous specific resource oriented honeypots have
emerged as independent honeypot software. On the other
hand, the cooperative honeypots can not only provide broader
views due to the distributed and cooperative deployment
in different network domains, but also create opportunities
of early network anomaly detection, attack correlation, and
global network status inference. Also, the cooperative ones
own robustness, reliability, reusability, and understandability
because of their decoupling feature.
All in all, though current honeypots have been evolving to
be increasingly complex and powerful, the decoy and security
program are the two fundamental elements, which originate all
the development in this important area. Therefore, this work
can help security researchers to gain insight into the honeypot
research area and explore the design and application space for
the future honeypot systems.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to appreciate Professor David
Chadwick at University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. He
conducted a thorough proofreading that improves the quality
of the whole paper.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Brandes, “The newest warfighting domain: Cyberspace,” Synesis: A
Journal of Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy, vol. 4, pp. G90–95,
2013.
[2] “Internet security threat report,” Symantec, Technical Report, 2016.
[3] G. J. Rattray, “An environmental approach to understanding
cyberpower,” Cyberpower and National Security, pp. 253–274,
2009.
[4] S. Peisert, M. Bishop, and K. Marzullo, “What do firewalls protect? an
empirical study of firewalls, vulnerabilities, and attacks,” UC Davis CS,
Technical Report CSE-2010-8, 2010.
[5] K. G. Anagnostakis, S. Sidiroglou, P. Akritidis, K. Xinidis, E. P.
Markatos, and A. D. Keromytis, “Detecting targeted attacks using
shadow honeypots,” in Usenix Security, 2005.
[6] W. Fan, K. Lwakatare, and R. Rong, “Social engineering: I-e based
model of human weakness for attack and defense investigations,”
International Journal of Computer Network and Information Security,
vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 1–11, 2017.
[7] V. Mateos, V. A. Villagra´, F. Romero, and J. Berrocal, “Definition of
response metrics for an ontology-based automated intrusion response
systems,” Computers & Electrical Engineering, vol. 38, no. 5, pp.
1102–1114, 2012, special issue on Recent Advances in Security and
Privacy in Distributed Communications and Image processing.
[8] G. Portokalidis, A. Slowinska, and H. Bos, “Argos: An emulator for
fingerprinting zero-day attacks for advertised honeypots with automatic
signature generation,” in Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys
European Conference on Computer Systems 2006, ser. EuroSys ’06.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2006, pp. 15–27.
[9] H. Artail, H. Safa, M. Sraj, I. Kuwatly, and Z. Al-Masri, “A hybrid
honeypot framework for improving intrusion detection systems in
protecting organizational networks,” Comput. Secur., vol. 25, no. 4, pp.
274–288, Jun. 2006.
[10] M. Bailey, E. Cooke, D. Watson, F. Jahanian, and N. Provos, “A
hybrid honeypot architecture for scalable network monitoring,” Technical
Report CSE-TR-499-04, University of Michigan, 2004.
[11] M. Nawrocki, M. Wa¨hlisch, C. Schmidt, T. C. andKeil, and
J. Scho¨nfelder, “A survey on honeypot software and data analysis,” ArXiv
e-prints, Aug. 2016.
[12] L. Spitzner, “The honeynet project: trapping the hackers,” IEEE Security
Privacy, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 15–23, Mar 2003.
[13] T. K. Lengyel, J. Neumann, S. Maresca, B. D. Payne, and A. Kiayias,
“Virtual machine introspection in a hybrid honeypot architecture,”
in Presented as part of the 5th Workshop on Cyber Security
Experimentation and Test. Berkeley, CA: USENIX, 2012.
[14] C. Stoll, The Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of
Computer Espionage. Gallery Books, 2000.
[15] B. Cheswick, “An evening with berferd in which a cracker is lured,
endured, and studied,” in In Proc. Winter USENIX Conference, 1992,
pp. 163–174.
[16] L. Spitzner, “Honeypots: catching the insider threat,” in Computer
Security Applications Conference, 2003. Proceedings. 19th Annual, Dec
2003, pp. 170–179.
[17] N. Provos, “A virtual honeypot framework,” in Proceedings of the 13th
Conference on USENIX Security Symposium (SSYM’04), Berkeley, CA,
USA, 2004, pp. 1–14.
[18] “Dionaea - catched bugs,” Nov. 2011. [Online]. Available:
http://dionaea.carnivore.it/
[19] M. Oosterhof, “Cowrie - active kippo fork,” July 2015. [Online].
Available: http://www.micheloosterhof.com/cowrie/
[20] CuckooFoundation, “Cuckoo,” Oct. 2014. [Online]. Available:
http://www.cuckoosandbox.org/
[21] D. Moore, C. Shannon, G. M. Voelker, and S. Savage, “Network
Telescopes: Technical Report,” University of California, San Diego,
Tech. Rep., July 2004.
IEEE SYSTEMS JOURNAL, VOL. , NO. , MONTH YEAR 13
[22] T. CYMRU, “The darknet project,” Jul. 2015. [Online]. Available:
http://www.team-cymru.org/darknet.html
[23] D. Song, R. Malan, and R. Stone, “A snapshot of global internet worm
activity,” in In Proc. first conference on computer security incident
handling and response, Jun. 2002.
[24] M. Bailey, E. Cooke, F. Jahanian, J. Nazario, and D. Watson, “The
internet motion sensor: A distributed blackhole monitoring system,” in
In Proceedings of Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
(NDSS 05, 2005, pp. 167–179.
[25] V. Yegneswaran, P. Barford, and D. Plonka, “On the design and use
of internet sinks for network abuse monitoring,” in Recent Advances in
Intrusion Detection, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, E. Jonsson,
A. Valdes, and M. Almgren, Eds. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004,
vol. 3224, pp. 146–165.
[26] M. Vrable, J. Ma, J. Chen, D. Moore, E. Vandekieft, A. Snoeren,
G. Voelker, and S. Savage, “Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the
Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm,” ACM Symposium on Operating System
Principles (SOSP), vol. 39, no. 5, pp. 148–162, Oct 2005.
[27] “Know your enemy: Honeynets,” May 2006. [Online]. Available:
http://old.honeynet.org/papers/honeynet/
[28] L. Spitzner, “Specter: A commercial honeypot solution for windows,”
2003. [Online]. Available: http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/
specter-commercial-honeypot-solution-windows/
[29] L. Rist, “Glastopf project,” 2009. [Online]. Available: http://glastopf.org/
[30] S. Poeplau and J. Gassen, “A honeypot for arbitrary malware on usb
storage devices,” in 2012 7th International Conference on Risks and
Security of Internet and Systems (CRiSIS), Oct 2012, pp. 1–8.
[31] N. Provos and T. Holz, Virtual honeypots: from botnet tracking to
intrusion detection, 1st ed. Addison Wesley, Jul. 2007.
[32] F. Gala´n, D. Ferna´ndez, W. Fuertes, M. Go´mez, and J. E.
Lo´pez de Vergara, “Scenario-based virtual network infrastructure
management in research and educational testbeds with vnuml,” annals
of telecommunications - annales des te´le´communications, vol. 64, no. 5,
pp. 305–323, 2009.
[33] L. K. Yan, “Virtual honeynets revisited,” in Information Assurance
Workshop, 2005. IAW ’05. Proceedings from the Sixth Annual IEEE
SMC, June 2005, pp. 232–239.
[34] F. Abbasi and R. Harris, “Experiences with a generation iii virtual
honeynet,” in Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference
(ATNAC), 2009 Australasian, Nov 2009, pp. 1–6.
[35] A. Capalik, “Next-generation honeynet technology with real-time
forensics for u.s. defense,” in Military Communications Conference,
2007. MILCOM 2007. IEEE, Oct 2007, pp. 1–7.
[36] N. Memari, K. Samsudin, and S. Hashim, “Towards virtual honeynet
based on lxc virtualization,” in Region 10 Symposium, 2014 IEEE, April
2014, pp. 496–501.
[37] P. Kasza, “Creating honeypots using docker,” 2015. [Online]. Available:
https://www.itinsight.hu/blog/posts/2015-05-04-creating-honeypots-using
-docker.html
[38] F. Gala´n and D. Ferna´ndez, “Use of vnuml in virtual honeynets
deployment,” IX Reunio´n Espan˜ola sobre Criptologı´a y Seguridad de
la Informacio´n (RECSI), Barcelona (Spain), 2006.
[39] F. Stumpf, A. Go¨rlach, F. Homann, and L. Bru¨ckner, “Nose-building
virtual honeynets made easy,” in Proc. of the 12th Intl Linux
System Technology Conference (Linux-Kongress 05), GUUG, 2005, pp.
1664–1669.
[40] D. Fernandez, A. Cordero, J. Somavilla, J. Rodriguez, A. Corchero,
L. Tarrafeta, and F. Galan, “Distributed virtual scenarios over multi-host
linux environments,” in Systems and Virtualization Management (SVM),
2011 5th International DMTF Academic Alliance Workshop on, Oct
2011, pp. 1–8.
[41] W. Fan, D. Fernndez, and Z. Du, “Versatile virtual honeynet management
framework,” IET Information Security, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 38–45, March
2016.
[42] W. Chin, E. Markatos, S. Antonatos, and S. Ioannidis, “Honeylab:
Large-scale honeypot deployment and resource sharing,” in Network and
System Security, 2009. NSS ’09. Third International Conference on, Oct
2009, pp. 381–388.
[43] B. Sobesto, M. Cukier, M. Hiltunen, D. Kormann, G. Vesonder,
and R. Berthier, “Darknoc: Dashboard for honeypot management,” in
Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Large Installation
System Administration, ser. LISA’11. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX
Association, 2011, pp. 16–16.
[44] W. Han, Z. Zhao, A. Doupe´, and G.-J. Ahn, “Honeymix: Toward
sdn-based intelligent honeynet,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM
International Workshop on Security in Software Defined Networks &#38;
Network Function Virtualization, ser. SDN-NFV Security ’16. New
York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016, pp. 1–6.
[45] R. do Carmo, M. Nassar, and O. Festor, “Artemisa: An open-source
honeypot back-end to support security in voip domains,” in
12th IFIP/IEEE International Symposium on Integrated Network
Management (IM 2011) and Workshops, May 2011, pp. 361–368.
[46] A. Podhradsky, C. Casey, and P. Ceretti, “The bluetooth honeypot
project: Measuring and managing bluetooth risks in the workplace,” Int.
J. Interdiscip. Telecommun. Netw., vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 1–22, Jul. 2012.
[47] L. Rist, J. Vestergaard, D. Haslinger, A. Pasquale, and J. Smith,
“Conpot ics/scada honeypot,” November 2013. [Online]. Available:
http://conpot.org/
[48] Y. M. P. Pa, S. Suzuki, K. Yoshioka, T. Matsumoto, T. Kasama, and
C. Rossow, “Iotpot: Analysing the rise of iot compromises,” in 9th
USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT 15). Washington,
D.C.: USENIX Association, Aug. 2015.
[49] S. Schindler, B. Schnor, and T. Scheffler, “Hyhoneydv6: A hybrid
honeypot architecture for ipv6 networks,” International Journal of
Intelligent Computing Research, vol. 6, 2015.
[50] W. Cui, V. Paxson, and N. C. Weaver, “Gq: Realizing a system to catch
worms in a quarter million places,” University of California, Berkeley,
CA, Technical Report TR-06-004, 2006.
[51] “Know your enemy: Sebek, a kernel based data capture tool,” nov
2003. [Online]. Available: http://old.honeynet.org/papers/sebek.pdf
[52] “Know your tools: Qebek - conceal the monitoring,” nov 2010.
[Online]. Available: http://www.honeynet.org/papers/KYT qebek
[53] C. Willems, T. Holz, and F. Freiling, “Toward automated dynamic
malware analysis using cwsandbox,” IEEE Security Privacy, vol. 5,
no. 2, pp. 32–39, March 2007.
[54] X. Jiang and X. Wang, “out-of-the-box monitoring of vm-based
high-interaction honeypots,” in Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection,
ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, C. Kruegel, R. Lippmann,
and A. Clark, Eds. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007, vol. 4637, pp.
198–218.
[55] LibVMIProject, “Libvmi,” 2015. [Online]. Available: http://libvmi.com/
[56] T. Garfinkel and M. Rosenblum, “A virtual machine introspection based
architecture for intrusion detection,” in In Proc. Network and Distributed
Systems Security Symposium, 2003, pp. 191–206.
[57] B. D. Payne, M. Carbone, M. Sharif, and W. Lee, “Lares: An
architecture for secure active monitoring using virtualization,” in 2008
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008), May 2008, pp.
233–247.
[58] X. Jiang, X. Wang, and D. Xu, “Stealthy malware detection
through vmm-based ”out-of-the-box” semantic view reconstruction,”
in Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, ser. CCS ’07. New York, NY, USA: ACM,
2007, pp. 128–138.
[59] J. Pfoh, C. Schneider, and C. Eckert, “Nitro: Hardware-based system
call tracing for virtual machines,” in Advances in Information and
Computer Security, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, T. Iwata
and M. Nishigaki, Eds. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011, vol. 7038,
pp. 96–112.
[60] D. Srinivasan and X. Jiang, “Time-traveling forensic analysis of
vm-based high-interaction honeypots,” in Proceedings of the 7th
International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication
Networks, ser. SecureComm2011, London, UK, September 2011.
[61] B. Dolan-Gavitt, T. Leek, M. Zhivich, J. Giffin, and W. Lee, “Virtuoso:
Narrowing the semantic gap in virtual machine introspection,” in 2011
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2011, pp. 297–312.
[62] T. K. Lengyel, S. Maresca, B. D. Payne, G. D. Webster, S. Vogl, and
A. Kiayias, “Scalability, fidelity and stealth in the drakvuf dynamic
malware analysis system,” in Proceedings of the 30th Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference, ser. ACSAC ’14. New York, NY,
USA: ACM, 2014, pp. 386–395.
[63] R. Pang, V. Yegneswaran, P. Barford, V. Paxson, and L. Peterson,
“Characteristics of internet background radiation,” in Proceedings of the
4th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement. ACM, 2004,
pp. 27–40.
[64] M. Bailey, E. Cooke, F. Jahanian, N. Provos, K. Rosaen, and D. Watson,
“Data reduction for the scalable automated analysis of distributed
darknet traffic,” in Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGCOMM conference
on Internet Measurement. USENIX Association, 2005, pp. 21–21.
[65] G. Portokalidis and H. Bos, “Sweetbait: Zero-hour worm detection
and containment using low-and high-interaction honeypots,” Computer
Networks, vol. 51, no. 5, pp. 1256–1274, 2007.
IEEE SYSTEMS JOURNAL, VOL. , NO. , MONTH YEAR 14
[66] W. Cui, V. Paxson, N. C. Weaver, and Y. H. Katz, “Protocol-independent
adaptive replay of application dialog,” in In The 13th Annual Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2006.
[67] X. Jiang and D. Xu, “Collapsar: A vm-based architecture for network
attack detention center.” in USENIX Security Symposium, 2004, pp.
15–28.
[68] “Know your enemy: Honeywall cdrom,” May 2005. [Online]. Available:
http://old.honeynet.org/papers/cdrom/
[69] E´. Alata, I. Alberdi, V. Nicomette, P. Owezarski, and M. Kaaˆniche,
“Internet attacks monitoring with dynamic connection redirection
mechanisms,” Journal in Computer Virology, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 127–136,
2008.
[70] J. Newsome and D. Song, “Dynamic taint analysis for automatic
detection, analysis, and signature generation of exploits on commodity
software,” in Proceedings of the 12th Annual Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium (NDSS ’05), 2005.
[71] C. Kreibich and J. Crowcroft, “Honeycomb: Creating intrusion detection
signatures using honeypots,” SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev.,
vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 51–56, Jan. 2004.
[72] A. Javaid, Q. Niyaz, W. Sun, and M. Alam, “A deep learning
approach for network intrusion detection system,” in Proceedings of
the 9th EAI International Conference on Bio-inspired Information and
Communications Technologies (Formerly BIONETICS), ser. BICT’15.
ICST, Brussels, Belgium, Belgium: ICST (Institute for Computer
Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering),
2016, pp. 21–26.
[73] R. Sekar, A. Gupta, J. Frullo, T. Shanbhag, A. Tiwari, H. Yang,
and S. Zhou, “Specification-based anomaly detection: A new approach
for detecting network intrusions,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ser. CCS ’02,
Washington, DC, USA, 2002, pp. 265–274.
[74] E. Kohler, R. Morris, B. Chen, J. Jannotti, and M. F. Kaashoek, “The
click modular router,” ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., vol. 18, no. 3, pp.
263–297, Aug. 2000.
[75] C. Yoon, T. Park, S. Lee, H. Kang, S. Shin, and Z. Zhang, “Enabling
security functions with sdn: A feasibility study,” Computer Networks,
vol. 85, no. C, pp. 19 – 35, 2015.
[76] R. Berthier and M. Cukier, “Honeybrid: A hybrid honeypot architecture,”
2008.
[77] H. Welte and P. N. Ayuso, “The libnetfilter queue project,” 2014.
[Online]. Available: http://www.netfilter.org/projects/libnetfilter queue/
[78] Y.-D. Lin, T.-B. Shih, Y.-S. Wu, and Y.-C. Lai, “Secure and transparent
network traffic replay, redirect, and relay in a dynamic malware analysis
environment,” Security and Communication Networks, vol. 7, no. 3, pp.
626–640, 2014.
[79] T. Lengyel, J. Neumann, S. Maresca, and A. Kiayias, “Towards hybrid
honeynets via virtual machine introspection and cloning,” in Network
and System Security, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, J. Lopez,
X. Huang, and R. Sandhu, Eds. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013, vol.
7873, pp. 164–177.
[80] W. Fan and D. Ferna´ndez, “A novel sdn based stealthy tcp connection
handover mechanism for hybrid honeypot systems,” in Proceedings
of IEEE 3rd Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft2017),
Bologna, Italy, July 2017.
[81] C. Hecker and B. Hay, “Automated honeynet deployment for dynamic
network environment,” in System Sciences (HICSS), 2013 46th Hawaii
International Conference on, Jan 2013, pp. 4880–4889.
[82] M. Zalewski, “pof v3,” 2012-2014. [Online]. Available:
http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/p0f3/
[83] G. Lyon, “Namp,” 2015. [Online]. Available: http://nmap.org/
[84] R. McGrew and R. B. Vaughn JR, “Experiences with honeypot
systems: Development, deployment, and analysis,” in Proceedings of
the 39th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
(HICSS’06), vol. 9, Jan 2006, p. 220a.
[85] M. Egele, T. Scholte, E. Kirda, and C. Kruegel, “A survey on automated
dynamic malware-analysis techniques and tools,” ACM Comput. Surv.,
vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 6:1–6:42, Mar. 2008.
[86] K. Rieck, P. Trinius, C. Willems, and T. Holz, “Automatic analysis of
malware behavior using machine learning,” J. Comput. Secur., vol. 19,
no. 4, pp. 639–668, Dec. 2011.
[87] “Know your enemy: Genii honeynets,” May 2005. [Online]. Available:
http://old.honeynet.org/papers/gen2/
[88] C. Leita and M. Dacier, “Sgnet: A worldwide deployable framework
to support the analysis of malware threat models,” in Dependable
Computing Conference, 2008. EDCC 2008. Seventh European, May
2008, pp. 99–109.
[89] S. Li and R. Schmitz, “A novel anti-phishing framework based on
honeypots,” in 2009 eCrime Researchers Summit, Sept 2009, pp. 1–13.
[90] X. Fu, B. Graham, D. Cheng, R. Bettati, and W. Zhao, “Camouflaging
virtual honeypots,” in In Texas A&M University, 2005.
[91] H. Wang and Q. Chen, “Dynamic deploying distributed low-interaction
honeynet,” Journal of Computers, vol. 7, no. 3, 2012.
Wenjun Fan is a Ph.d. candidate at the Department of Telematics Engineering
at Technical University of Madrid (UPM) since 2011. His research interests
are cyber security, SDN and NFV, cloud computing and adversarial machine
learning.
Zhihui Du received the BE degree in 1992 in Computer Department from
Tianjian University. He received the MS and PhD degrees in computer
science, respectively, in 1995 and 1998, from Peking University. From 1998
to 2000, he worked at Tsinghua University as a postdoctoral researcher. Since
2001, he is working at Tsinghua University as an associate professor in the
Department of Computer Science and Technology. His research areas include
high performance computing and grid computing.
David Ferna´ndez is an associate professor of computer networks at Technical
University of Madrid (UPM). He received a telecommunications engineering
M.Sc. degree in 1988 and a Ph.D. in telematics engineering in 1993, both from
Technical University of Madrid. His research interests are computer-supported
cooperative work, advanced Internet protocols, and network virtualization.
Vı´ctor A. Villagra´ is an associate professor in telematics engineering at
the UPM since 1992. His research interests include Network Management,
Advanced Services Design and Network Security.
